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Abstract—Malware proliferation and sophistication have 
drastically increased and evolved continuously. Recent 
indiscriminate ransomware victimizations have imposed critical 
needs of effective detection techniques to prevent damages. 
Therefore, ransomware has drawn attention among cyberspace 
researchers. This paper contributes a comprehensive overview of 
ransomware attacks and summarizes existing detection and 
prevention techniques in both Windows and Android platforms. 
Moreover, it highlights the strengths and shortcomings of those 
techniques and provides a comparison between them. 
Furthermore, it gives recommendations to users and system 
administrators. 
 
Index Terms—Windows ransomware, Android ransomware, 
crypto-ransomware, locker-ransomware, ransomware families, 
countermeasures 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cyber-extorting malware is increasing and evolving con-
tinuously. Throughout its growth, it has posed major threats to 
modern technologies with daunting prevention tasks. For 
instance, computer systems’ security critically depends on the 
ability of anti-malware products that must be abreast of new 
malware deployments. Authors of malware try to thwart anti-
malware detection by implementing efforts that are more 
significant [1]. Moreover, some malware has a powerful instru-
ment for illegal commercial activities such as ransomware.  
Ransomware is defined as a form of malware that de-ceives 
users and infects their devices to limit or deny access. Hence, 
attackers demand payments from the victims for a promise to 
restore their data, and affected devices do not permit access 
until the ransom is paid [2]. Cyberattack writers have 
diversified their efforts to make money by using well-
established methods. Ransomware has constituted as one of 
the most dangerous cyberattacks facing both organizations 
and individual users with global losses now likely running to 
billions of dollars. This type of attack is the latest trend that 
cybercriminals use for monetization by extorting their victims  
[3]. Moreover, ransomware’s recent success has 
increased the appearance of new families in the last few 
years [4]. It spreads rapidly through websites, infected 
software and even email attachments.  
As many categories of malware, ransomware uses some 
techniques to evade detection systems in order to trick the 
victims. It is able to encrypt files and establish secure con-
nection with a Command and Control (C&C) server [5], [6]. 
Also, ransomware can exfiltrate users’ information to a third 
party as well as perform multi-infection and process injection. 
 
 
 
Ransomware exhibits behavioral differences if compared to 
traditional malware. For instance, most malware types aim 
to steal users’ data, like banking credentials, without raising 
sus-picions. In contrast, ransomware operations behave 
differently since the attack notifies victims that their devices 
have been infected [7]. 
This paper focuses on Windows and Android, the plat-forms 
frequently targeted by ransomware attacks due to their 
popularity in both desktop and mobile market-share. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the 
concept of ransomware, and illustrates the functionality and 
how it works. Then, a brief overview of the history of 
ransomware cyberattacks is provided in Section III. Section IV 
lists the most affected industry sectors by malware attacks 
around the world. Next, Sections V and VI summarize the 
notable observed behaviors of ransomware in the Windows 
and Android platforms, respectively. Section VII provides a 
ransomware attack taxonomy, whereas Section VIII lists 
existing countermeasures and prevention techniques. Aiming 
to educate the users, Section IX provides a set of policies and 
recommendations. Finally, Section X concludes the paper. 
 
II. HOW RANSOMWARE WORKS 
 
There are two types of ransomware: locker-ransomware and 
crypto-ransomware [8]. In the first type, blockers prevent 
victims from accessing their devices. Locker-ransomware can 
lock the whole screen of the device and demand payment. 
Typically, it masquerades as a notice from a local law en-
forcement agency reporting an illegal action done by the user 
and indicating a spot-fine ransom. It does not encrypt any files 
or affect the data stored on the device. A notable example of 
locker-ransomware is WinLocker [9], [10].  
By contrast, crypto-ransomware encrypts device services and 
files, or even the entire database that the system interacts with. 
Usually, once a file/folder is encrypted, it will be deleted from the 
device. Then a threatening message is displayed with a link to the 
acceptable payment methods and instructions [11]. Encryption 
keys can be generated locally by the ransomware on infected 
machines, or remotely on a C&C server as il-lustrated in 
subsection V-C. Furthermore, accessing encrypted files is 
restricted by withholding the decryption key [5]. A notable example 
of this type is the CryptoLocker family [12].  
After performing a successful infection, the malicious pro-
gram notifies the user by displaying a ransom message, which 
relies on Bitcoins currency for more confidentiality and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ransomware timeline over the history 
 
 
anonymity. This message contains instructions on how to 
pay the ransom in order to restore access to the encrypted 
data. Those persistent messages can be generated by 
calling some dedicated API functions such as 
CreateDesktop(), which creates a new desktop and makes 
it a default for infected machines, locking out the users [13].  
Additionally, ransomware cybercriminals do not deter large 
due to their extortion campaigns. Hence, analysts discriminate 
ransomware from wiping attacks. Ransomware attackers are 
mostly on the benefit of an unlikely trusted relationship with 
infected users. Attackers rely on the tenet that they will abide 
by an implicit agreement with their victims to restore access to 
their files once they make the payment. However, “skiddie” 
cybercriminals trick their victims into paying the ransom and 
never return the victims’ files [14]. 
 
III. HISTORY OF RANSOMWARE 
 
Crypto-based attacks are relatively old. The first known 
form was written by Joseph Popp and released in 1989 
named AIDS, short for Aids Info Desk. It is also known as 
PC Cyborg, which was the first crypto ransomware at-tack 
seen in December 1989 [15]. This version replaced the 
AUUTOEXEC.BAT file, and counted how many times the 
machine was booted. Once it reached a certain time, it hid 
directories and encrypted their names. Then it displayed a 
message claiming that a license of some software that the 
user used is expired, and asked the user to pay some 
amount in order to obtain a repair tool. This attack used a 
combination of a symmetric cryptography and an 
initialization vector to encrypt files in a victim’s machine. 
Hence, the key could be extracted from its code [11].  
Since then, AIDS has been present until now, but has signif-
icant changes [16]. Adam L.Young and Moti Yung proposed 
the concept of using asymmetric key in 1996 [17]. At that time, 
cryptographic libraries were restricted by governments’ 
legislation. They showed that the AIDS was ineffective by 
using one key. Therefore, they introduced public key cryptog-
raphy for such attacks. In this attack release, the user’s files 
were encrypted using the ransomware author’s public key. In 
order to decrypt those files, victim needs to get a decryption 
key, which could be obtained after they pay their ransoms. 
 
 
 
Locker ransomware appeared as SMS, the master boot record 
(MBR), and fake FBI ransomware. The first locker ransomware 
came into existence in 2004 as Antivirus software. In 2005, a 
series of fake Antivirus ransomware variants appeared such as 
Spysherriff, Registry care, and Performance Optimizer [18]. The 
last two variants offered paid solutions for problems, which did not 
actually exist in the victim’s machine. Furthermore, they were 
deployed over the Internet until 2008.  
Cybercriminals have implied more effective and sophisti-
cated Trojans using asymmetric RSA encryption schemes. A 
pair of keys are generated in asymmetric cryptosystem known 
as public key and private key. The public key is embedded in 
the payload of the ransomware to encrypt data on the victim’s 
machine. On the other hand, the private key is kept secret and 
only known by the payload’s writer. Thus, encrypted data can 
be recovered at the writer-side, and malware analysts cannot 
determine the private key from monitoring the operations of 
ransomware as used with symmetric schemes. Notable exam-
ples of this type are Gpcode, MayArchive, TROJ.RANSOM.A, 
Archiveus, and Krotten [19].  
New families appeared and started spreading in 2006 
such as Cryzip and Archiveus [20]. These variants sniff out 
for specific type of files to make them inaccessible. For 
instance, Cryzip encrypts particular extensions, then moves 
those encrypted files into a zipped folder. Whereas 
Archiveus moves files into a password protected folder.  
In 2010, MBR ransomware variants made their first ap-
pearance under name Ransom.Boot.Seftad.a. Another type 
called bootlock.B came into existence in 2011. It replaces the 
original MBR with its code and locks the user’s machine then 
displays a ransom message at booting time. This type never 
uses encryption. Moreover, the year of 2011 was the first year 
of Fake FBI ransomware to come into existence by the 
appearance of Ransomlock family [21], [22]. Additionally, in 
2012 other families of the Fake FBI ransomware started 
spreading such as ACCDFISA and Reveton. The ransom 
payments of these families were displayed in an official format 
as a local law enforcement agency.  
In 2013, new families appeared including Virlock and 
Kovter with the continuation of new variants of Reveton 
and Ransomlock families. A huge comeback was made 
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Table I: Top five industry sectors targeted by ransomware 
 
Sector Name Percentage of attacks 
Education 23% 
  
IT Telecoms 22% 
  
Financial Services 21% 
  
Government Sectors 18% 
  
Healthcare 16% 
  
 
 
by crypto ransomware with Cryptolocker, Cryptolocker 2, Dirty 
Decrypt, Crilock, and Ransomcrypt [13]. Whereas in 2015, 
new classes of Cryptolocker, TelsaCrypt, Cryptoblocker, 
CryptoTorLocker, CryptoFortress, Ransomcrypt, Ransomweb, 
Vaultcrypt, Troldesh, Pclock, Cryptowall 3 and Cryptowall 4 
were introduced [8]. Most of recent crypto variants grow with 
sophisticated and diverse encryption techniques. They are 
written in scripting languages, becoming more targeted and 
exploiting new infection paths. For instance, Cryptowall 3, 
which has been released into the wild by a Russian cybercrime 
gang, uses Tor anonymity network for C&C communication [5], 
[23]. Ransomware-as-a-service came to existence, which 
makes ransomware attacks available to everyone receiving a 
commission on every successful campaign [20].  
According to Kaspersky report for the year of 2016 [14], 
there were 62 new ransomware families appeared. It can 
be declared the year of ransomware. Ransom32, Locky, 
PH-PRamson and HydraCrypto are notable examples of 
those variants. However, starting from the year of 2016, 
security organizations have begun a union to fight back 
under name No More Ransom. This collaboration has 
resulted in a number of free decryption tools that have 
helped thousands of users to recover their data. In addition, 
the biggest surprise of this year was the shutdown of 
TeslaCrypt by the malware actors themselves. Figure 1 
summarizes the ransomware history timeline. 
 
IV. RANSOMWARE VS. BUSINESS 
 
Many ransomware attacks are indiscriminate and the in-
fection is similar for businesses and individual consumers. 
However, a number of cybercriminal groups have begun im-
plementing specific ransomware attacks to target businesses 
and infect multiple computers on a single network. Further-
more, major ransomware robbers are capable of pushing their 
malicious activities to millions of computers around the globe. 
The perfection of this business model has created a 
competitive mentality among attackers. As a result, the 
infection numbers are trending upwards, and victims find their 
valuable data locked with strong and unbreakable encryption 
[24]. Further-more, according to the annual report by 
Kaspersky, by the end of 2016, there was one attack every 40 
seconds targeting business organizations. In addition, one in 
five small and medium-sized business (SMBs) have paid their 
ransoms, but never received their data back [4].  
Another report was made by Symantec in 2016 [25], an 
incremental number of gangs have focused on attacking large 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The recent growth of ransomware attacks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Top five countries hit by ransomware 
 
 
organizations. Those attacks have used techniques that are 
commonly seen in cyberespionage campaigns and involved 
a high level of technical expertise to break into targeted 
networks. Once it traverses the network successfully, it can 
cause massive operational disruptions or even stops the 
entire business, leading into serious damages to revenues 
and reputa-tion. Table I shows the most common industry 
sectors that are hit by ransomware. Additionally, the curve 
in Figure 2 shows the tremendous spike of this type of 
malware in the last five years until September 2017. 
Whereas, Figure 3 shows the top five countries that were 
hit by ransomware attacks as of the end of 2016 [25]. 
 
V. RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS ON WINDOWS PLATFORM 
 
Sectors’ data can be infected through compromised soft-
ware, malicious email attachments, and drive-by download 
exploit kits and advertisements, which is installed without 
user knowledge when browsing suspicious websites [26], 
[27]. The following list contains the notable observed 
behaviors of ransomware in the Windows platform: 
 
A. File System Activities 
 
A large number of malware sample executions lead to file 
system changes. During the execution of ransomware 
payload, new files are created and existing files are modified 
or even deleted. Files such as .txt,.log,and.tmp are usually 
created and modified constantly [28]. For instance, CryptoWall 
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variants modify PIPE\lsarpc,MousePointManager as well as 
an .exe file inside the temp folder that belongs to the 
administrator account. Also, they modify system.pif in the 
Start Menu in order to restart some particular software even 
if the machine is rebooted [16]. Additionally, some 
Cryptolocker variants create some executable files and 
mod-ify folders under C:\DocumentsandSettings as well as 
TemporaryInternetFiles in order to change the browser’s 
homepage and display the ransom message [29]. 
Moreover, Ransomware variants can delete all volume 
shadow copies, back-up files, and restore points by using 
the vssadmin tool [30]. 
 
B. Registry Activities 
 
Registry is a hierarchical database that stores low-level 
settings and operations for the operating system. It can be 
used by the kernel, services, device drivers, the Security 
Accounts Manager (SAM), and user interfaces (UIs). 
Registry contains settings, options, and other configuration 
information for software and hardware components that 
have been installed on the OS. Some malware (e.g. 
ransomware variants) creates a registry key once it is 
installed to take control over the system. For instance, 
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\ System key is used to 
prevent users from invoking the task manager [28], [1].  
Furthermore, most types of ransomware families 
manipulate or delete many existing registry keys, subkeys, 
values, and value data in order to persist and function 
properly. Notable examples of those registry keys can be 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ 
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,HKEY_LOCAL_ 
MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\ 
CurrentVersion\WinLogon, and HKEY_LOCAL_ 
MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ 
Nls\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName. However, some 
others read registry values, such as Microsoft Strong 
Cryptographic Provider (MS STRONG PROV) 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\ 
Defaults\Providerv1.0, which is used as the default RSA 
Full (PROV RSA FULL) cryptographic service provider 
(CSP) [31].  
 
C. Network Activities 
 
Moving from symmetric encryption to asymmetric encryp-
tion in cyber-extoring threats has enhanced more communica-
tions through the network. In a ransomware scenario, when a 
machine is infected, it communicates with the C&C server to 
obtain a public key. This can be done through multiple proxy 
servers that are typically hacked, as shown in Figure  
4. Most of these communications are made through ports 80 
and 443 (TCP connections), and port 53 (UDP connections) 
[16]. For instance, CryptoWall variants use HTTP protocol 
(POST messages) to contact a C&C server. Instead of using 
IP addresses directly, they use domain names [5]. In addition, 
some ransomware variants have the ability to crawl the entire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Asymmetric encryption scheme  
 
 
network to encrypt all existing files and lock all attached 
computers [9]. 
 
D. Communication Devices 
 
Variants of cyberattacks use some devices’ controls 
during their executions on the endpoint machines. 
Cryptlocker, Reve-ton, and CrypCTB ransomware 
families use many devices to communicate, such as:  
\Device\Afd\Endpoint, which is a symbolic link 
referred to the device that transfers packets to the 
local network and Internet.  
\Device\Tcp, for TCP connections.  
\Device\KsecDD provides the kernel security device 
driver.  
MountPointManager driver is responsible for main-
taining persistent drive letters and names for volumes.  
The rest of the ransomware variants use \Device\ 
KsecDD device to communicate with the victim’s 
machine [32], [33]. 
 
E. Encryption Mechanism 
 
Generally, a cryptosystem and its suites are defensive, 
and provide privacy and security [17]. It is a boon to the 
secu-rity society. However, it makes a ladder for extortion-
based cryptovirus attacks. Some techniques of 
cryptosystems make use of standard Windows functions to 
perform encryption such as CryptoWall and CryptoLocker 
families, by simply calling CryptEncrypt [13].  
Modern ransomware mixes techniques from well-
established benign cryptography suites called hybrid 
cryptosystem. In this technique, the ransomware generates a 
random symmetric key (commonly referred to as a session 
key) for each targeted object (message, file, folder, etc.), and 
encrypts it by using its key. Subsequently, the hybrid 
cryptosystem encrypts the symmetric key with an asymmetric 
encryption using a public key generated on the attacker’s 
command and control infrastructure and embedded to the 
payload infecting victims’ machines [13]. Thus, the asymmetric 
cryptographic operations are only required to encrypt and 
decrypt the small symmetric key regardless 
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Table II: Common C&C commands 
  
Command Usage 
COMMON_HELLO Checks if encryption key matches received key 
  
COMMAND_SECRET Changes communication encryption key 
  
COMMAND_BOT_ID Sets new BOT_ID malware 
  
COMMAND_ENCRYPT Encrypts files on external storage 
  
COMMAND_DECRYPT Decrypts files on external storage 
  
COMMAND_PASSWORD Sets new password used to encrypt/decrypt files 
  
COMMAND_JID_CONFIG Modifies the XMPP accounts parameter BUILTIN_JID 
  
COMMAND_SERVER_MESSAGES Instructs malware to change all COMMANDS keys to new ones 
  
COMMAND_VOUCHER_MESSAGE Sets a VOUCHER ERROR MESSAGE 
  
COMMAND_CALL Calls given number 
  
COMMAND_SMS Sends SMS to given number 
  
 
 
of the encrypted content’s size. As a result, the strength 
of ransomware racket is equal to the security of a hybrid 
cryptosystem [34]. 
 
F. Locking Mechanism 
 
Types of ransomware in this mechanism lock out machine 
resources as well as input devices connected to the infected 
machine. In some cases, they use JavaScript codes to change 
the settings of browsers such as Google Chrome, or to flash a 
full screen image to block all other windows. Then it creates a 
fake message claiming a prohibited action has been done by 
the user, and includes a ransom note. This approach keeps 
the system and its files untouched, which makes it possible to 
remove such a malware by restoring the system to its original 
state. Moreover, it allows a limited functionality access such as 
enabling the mouse and numeric keyboard keys on the victim’s 
machine to only interact with the ransomware, and denies any 
other access [35]. 
 
VI. RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS ON ANDROID PLATFORM 
 
In most cases, reverse engineering technique is used to 
analyze this class of Android malware. Mainly, it focuses on 
the Manifestfile.xml and the course code files of the app. The 
following subsections describe the most malicious payload 
activities that are observed by existing analysis tools. 
 
A. Privilege Escalation 
 
Sensitive operating system services require special privilege 
and access control to execute their tasks in secure manners. 
Services that are running on computers and connected to the 
Internet present a target for adversaries to compromise them  
[36]. As a result, it can lead to unauthorized access to some 
sensitive resources. Configuration oversight and design flaw 
can lead to a privilege escalation. For example, programming 
errors in privileged services may allow adversaries to com-
promise the system in the form of unauthorized acquisition of 
privileges [37]. Android malware authors pack and obfuscate 
their payload to bypass restrictions imposed by sandboxes. In 
addition, if attacks obtain root privileges, they can break down 
the whole security system and pose serious threats, 
 
 
which makes removing malicious applications from the 
device difficult [38]. 
 
B. Remote Control 
 
As any other regular piece of software that requires secure 
communication, earlier malware packages communicate with a 
website through HTTPS to get encryption keys. Typically, 
when an application makes a secure HTTP request to commu-
nicate with a suspicious target, it is a clear hint of malicious 
activities [39]. However, the new variants communicate via the 
Extensible Massaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). Such a 
protocol facilitates communications with the C&C server, which 
looks like normal instant message (IM) communica-tions. 
Messages can be encrypted by using the Transport Layer 
Security (TLS). Thus, it is more difficult to detect ransomware 
using anti-malware software. Table II summarizes the common 
commands used in C&C server communications. 
 
C. Sensitive Data Collection 
 
Android operating system APIs provide installed apps with large 
amounts of user’s information. This information can be locations, 
contacts, IMEI, call logs, profile, browser history and bookmarks, 
phone state, SMS, installed apps, etc. Mal-ware uses collected 
information for different purposes without the user’s awareness 
[40]. Additionally, ransomware variants check the running tasks on 
the device in order to evade and bypass detection systems [41]. 
With some special permissions and components, ransomware 
apps can manipulate and kill any other running processes that are 
not the malware itself [42]. 
 
D. Encryption and Locking Mechanisms 
 
Historically, the potential use of cryptographic schemes for 
offensive purposes was documented for decades, as Section II 
indicated. Recent ransomware attacks try to obtain administra-
tor privileges in order to perform their activities such as setting 
a new PIN for the screen and locking the entire device [16]. 
Another locking technique is to superimpose a full screen alert 
message so that the user can only interact with the 
ransomware dialog. Furthermore, trapping key-pressure 
events is another common locking way used by some variants 
to deny switching away from the lock screen [43]. 
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 Table III: Permissions requested by ransomware 
  
Permission Behavior 
READ_PHONE_STATE Permits to access phone state 
  
INTERNET Permits apps to connect to the Internet 
  
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Permits apps to read browser history and bookmarks 
  
BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN Permits interaction between device administration receiver and the system 
  
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Permits apps to access the network information 
  
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Permits apps to access Wi-Fi networks information 
  
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Permits apps to write to external storage 
  
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Permits apps to read from external storage 
  
WRITE_SETTINGS Permits apps to read or write system setting 
  
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW Permits apps to alert system 
  
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Permits apps to receive the ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcasted after the system finishes booting 
  
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Permits apps to access approximate location 
  
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Permits an app to access precise location 
  
WAKE_LOCK Used to prevent the device from going to sleep 
  
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES Used to kill any other running processes that are not the malware itself or the phone setting application 
  
INSTALL_SHORTCUT Permits an app to install a shortcut in Launcher 
  
GET_TASKS Permits an app to get information about the currently or recently running tasks 
  
GET_ACCOUNTS Permits access to the list of accounts in Accounts Service 
  
READ_CONTACTS Allows apps to read contacts information 
  
READ_CALL_LOG Allows apps to read call log 
  
DISABLE_KEYGUARD Used to disable keyguard when it is not secure 
  
CALL_PHONE Permits an app to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer UI for the user to confirm the call 
  
READ_SMS Allows apps to read SMS 
  
RECEIVE_SMS Allows apps to receive SMS 
  
SEND_SMS Allows apps to send SMS 
  
CAMERA Permits apps to access the camera 
  
 
 
Ransomware variants imply various extortion techniques 
in order to encrypt the data and lock the device. Usually, it 
searches for particular files to encrypt them. For example, 
Crypto-ransom like Pletor and Simplocker use AES 
encryption scheme to encrypt data that is presented in SD 
card. Further-more, some variants only encrypt the device 
and leave the data untouched. Whereas some others 
encrypt the data and leave the device open. Thus, even 
after removing the malware, the victim has no choice than 
paying the ransom in order to restore access [43], [44]. 
 
E. Permissions Used 
 
An app installation process demands some permissions to 
be granted in order to function properly [45]. Users can see 
permission requirements prior and after the installation. 
However, ordinary users may unintentionally download some 
apps without paying attention to their permissions. Such a 
security weakness allows malware to pretend as normal apps  
[46]. Table III shows common permissions that a 
ransomware variant may request. Note that some 
permissions can be demanded by benign apps as well [47]. 
 
VII. RANSOMWARE TAXONOMY 
 
So far, this article has done a systematic review of the terms 
related to ransomware attacks and summarized behavioral 
descriptions of the topmost families based on the number of 
 
 
infected users. It categorized those families into two 
main categories based on the variant actions and 
behaviors. These categories are cryptographic and 
locking ransomware as fol-lows: 
 
A. Cryptographic Ransomware 
 
Ransomware scenarios have been used for mass extortion. 
However, a pronounced trend in recent years has been the 
shift towards cryptographic ransomware. The proportion of 
new crypto-ransomware variants is growing every year. The 
growth of this type can be explained by the fact that it is the 
most effective form of ransomware [25]. A few years ago, the 
market was dominated with misleading apps. Many of those 
applications were designed to pose as an anti-virus software  
[48]. They inform users that there is something wrong 
with their machines, which is a result of the malware 
infection, and then they request some amount of money 
in order to fix the problem.  
Traditionally, successful ransomware attacks perform 
one or more of the following activities:  
Indiscriminate encryption: this crypto-type aggressively 
encrypts and deletes the user’s private files. Cybercrim-
inals can overwrite files with the encrypted versions, or 
delete the original files by using Windows API functions or 
Windows Secure Deletion API to perform secure deletion. 
A notable example of this type is TorrentLocker, 
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which encrypts the first two megabytes of all 
existing files on the system [49], [7].  
Selective encryption: this form of cryptovirus attacks, 
encrypts, and deletes user’s private files based on 
specific attributes such as size and extensions. It 
performs a selective encryption in order to avoid 
detection systems [16], [7]. A notable example of this 
type is any variant of the Cryptowall family [50]. 
 
The following list summarizes topmost cryptographic 
ran-somware families. It aims to define each type and 
how it works:  
1) Petya: Petya appeared in March 2016 as a partial disk 
cryptosystem. Instead of file encryption, this variant encrypts 
the master file table. Therefore, files on disk will be prevented 
from being located. Once the ransom is made, the encryption 
key will unlock the master file table and reboot record, and 
then the malware boot loader will be removed. Petya variant is 
especially troublesome because unlike other variants, it does 
not require any Internet connection in order to generate the 
encryption key [23], [51]. 
A new variant has appeared in June 2017 called NotPetya. 
Petya was described as a criminal enterprise for making 
money. However, this latest form is not designed to make 
money. The main goal behind NotPetya is to spread fast and 
cause damage with a plausibly deniable cover of ransomware. 
It takes out businesses from shipping ports and supermarkets 
to ad agencies and law firms. Furthermore, once this well-oiled 
destructive program infects a corporate network, it worms its 
way from one computer to another and harms the file systems 
of the infected machines. After that, it demands about $300 in 
Bitcoin to unscramble the hostage data. In addition, NotPetya 
contains certain mechanisms to collect this money from victims 
and exchange decryption keys [52]. The following is a 
summary of the NotPetya outbreak: 
 
It uses other tools to spread through a network and 
infects machines such as a tweaked build of open-source 
Minikatz, which is used to extract network administrator 
credentials out of the machine’s running memory. 
Collected information is used to communicate with 
other machines by using PsExec and Windows 
Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) 
to infect them and execute commands. The PsExec is 
a light-weight telnet-replacement that allows 
cybercriminals to execute processes on other systems.  
It can also identify known hosts by using the Dynamic 
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) service.  
A stolen and leaked version of the NSA EternalBlue 
SMB exploit as well as the agency EternalRomance 
SMB exploit are used to inject malicious codes into 
other systems. 
 
As of March 2017, Microsoft has patched these cyber-weapons 
attack vulnerabilities. However, the credential theft becomes more 
successful at places that are on top of their Win-dows updates. As 
a simple solution against these new attacks, researchers 
explained that before overwriting the computer’s 
 
Master Boot Record, the ransomware checks for the 
perfc file in the C:\Windows folder. If it does not exist, 
then the ransomware will encrypt the computer. 
However, if that file is present, then the ransomware will 
stop. Hence, in order to halt the encryption in its tracks, 
users need to create a perfc file in the C:\Windows 
folder and make it read only [51], [52].  
2) Simplocker: Simplocker a mobile Trojan form discov-
ered in June 2014 and considered as the first type of encrypt-
ransomware to attack Android devices. At that time, Sim-
plocker (or Simplelocker) was heavily inspired by desktop 
crypto-ransomware. However, the Android’s security model 
was able to curtail its scam. The reason behind that was 
related to the security restriction, which prevents apps from 
accessing files and data that belong to other apps unless 
permissions are granted to do so. Android.Simplocker uses 
256-bit AES key (symmetric encryption) to encrypt files on the 
user’s device. The key is included in the application code, 
which means that it does not need to communicate with a C&C 
server to complete its encryption process.  
However, malware writers can send commands to this 
type through SMS messages such as encrypt/decrypt a 
user’s file. Additionally, in previous versions of Android 
operation systems, files such as images and media were 
stored on unprotected external SD memory cards. Hence, 
they could be accessed by other applications. Malware 
applications, like Simplocker, could access those files 
stored in the memory card and encrypt them [18].  
3) GPcode: GPcode a Trojan malware that encrypts files with 
certain extensions (such as .html, .rar, .txt, .doc, .jpg) on the 
infected machine or drives and asks users to contact its author to 
buy a decryption solution and retrieve access. GPcode family 
(GPC) was reported as the first wave of modern ransomware, 
which started in May 2005 with Trojan.Gpcoder as one of the 
crypto ransomware threats [18]. Initially, variants of 
Trojan.Gpcoder used custom-encryption techniques that were 
weak and easy to beak. Despite those initial failures, the authors 
of cyberattacks continued to enhance better tech-niques and 
create newer versions of GPcode threats such as backdoors. 
Furthermore, a new version was discovered in November 2010 
that used a stronger encryption technique (RSA-1024 and AES-
256) and overwrites the encrypted files to make file recovery 
nearly impossible [53]. 
 
In addition, once a variant is installed on the machine, it 
usually creates two registry keys. The first registry key is used 
to ensure that it is running on every system boot. On the other 
hand, the second registry key monitors the Trojan’s progress 
in the infected machine and count the number of files that have 
been analyzed by the malicious code. Recent variants of GCP 
are know as .LOL or .OMG [54], [55].  
4) Cerber: As of March 2016, this crypto family has made 
its newest arrival on the ransomware scene. Since then, 
Cerber has made a significant impact due to its novelty and 
nasty behaviors. One of its novel features is its use of a text-
to-speech (TTS) module to speak to the victim, which lets the 
threat read the ransom note loudly [56], [57]. More 
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interestingly, Cerber does not infect users from some particular 
countries. When a machine is infected, Cerber will check the 
victim’s location. If the computer appears to be from certain 
countries, Cerber will terminate itself and not encrypt any files. 
Otherwise, it will perform its malicious activities and encrypt 
files using AES-256 encryption algorithm [58].  
Furthermore, once Cerber is installed, it will name it-self 
after a random Windows executable. After that, it uses the 
command C:\Windows\System32\bcdedit. 
exe"/set{current}safebootnetwork to configure the operating 
system (Windows) to automatically boot into Safe Mode 
with Networking on the next reboot. The infected computer 
will then reboot into Safe Mode with Networking and once 
the user logs in, Cerber will automatically shut down the 
computer again and reboot it back into normal mode. Then 
it will configure itself to run automatically when users log in 
to Windows, then execute its tasks as one task per minute. 
Once Cerber executes these tasks, it will show a fake 
system alert and ask to restart the computer [58].  
5) Locky: Locky arrived in late 2015 and early 2016. 
This nasty and virulent strain of ransomware variants 
has been propagated widely, mainly through massive 
spam email campaigns and compromised websites. For 
example, Locky will attach Word documents, which 
contain a malicious macro to these emails. Once the 
macro is run, it will install Locky on the victim’s machine.  
Even with the increased focus on security in organizations, a 
few ransomware payloads have made it onto their computers. 
Hence, many businesses were hit in this onslaught of spam [59]. 
Since the early Spring of 2016, the emergence of Locky has been 
counted as one of the most prolific ransomware attacks created to 
date. Recently, the cybercriminal group behind Locky has begun 
to use a new downloader, which is known as Rockloader 
(Downloader.Zirchap), in its spam campaigns. When the victim is 
infected with Rockloader, it will download and install Locky onto 
the computer [56].  
6) CryptXXX: This family made its first appearance in April 
2016. It was circulated widely by the infamous Angler and 
Neutrino exploit kits. Initial variants of this class used 
compromised websites to redirect infected computers to the 
Angler exploit kit and involved Angler first dropping Tro-
jan.Bedep [60] on those computers, which infected them with 
CryptXXX. This exploit kit was the most popular delivery 
method used to deliver ransomware variants to potential vic-
tims. However, within a few weeks of its release, the Angler 
exploit kit was dropped and eventually shut down completely. 
Consequently, it led to a sudden drop off in the activities 
related to a number of major malware families, including 
CryptXXX. Since then, this threat is being distributed by the 
infamous Neutrino and RIG exploit kits [20], [61].  
Due to the weak encryption techniques that were used in 
the initial variants of CryptXXX, security researchers were able 
to create a decryption tool for compromised computers. 
However, attackers behind this attack responded quickly and 
released a newer variant of CryptXXX by employing a better 
encryption approach. Moreover, the new version of CryptXXX 
 
contains a new StillerX credential-stealing module that gives 
attackers additional capabilities to monetize the attacks. It has 
also been armed with a sniffing capability that can sniffs out 
files to encrypt even if they are not locally stored. Thereby, 
multilayered network and end-user protections remain critical 
to prevent data exfiltration in case of infection [62].  
Furthermore, cybercriminals have continued to refine Cryp-
tXXX with more updated features such as scanning for 
network shares and encrypting them. To find and encrypt 
shared resources on the network, new variants of this family 
exhibit scanning activity on the network gateway port 445, 
which is used for SMB (aka Server Message Block) and 
primarily associated with Microsoft Windows Domain and 
Active Directory infrastructure [63]. In addition, CryptXXX has 
received a major overhaul by its authors and been marked as 
a top moneymaker for criminals compared to Locky [56].  
7) CryptoWall: CryptoWall was first appeared in early 2014 
and has the same strategy as many crypto-ransomware types. 
After the downfall of CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, formerly known 
as Cryptorbit or CryptoDefense, started to gain no-toriety. It is 
distributed as fake application updates such as Adobe Reader 
and Java Runtime Environment. CryptoWall can be facilitated 
using many typical threat distribution channels, such as pop-up 
windows if the user visits suspicious websites or opens spam 
emails. Moreover, CryptoWall 4.0 is now folded into the 
Nuclear Exploit Kit and can run on both 32-bit and 64-bit 
systems [64].  
In addition, initial variants of CryptoWall used the RSA 
public key, which is generated on the C&C server, to encrypt 
crucial files. However, recent variants such as CryptoWall 3.0 
use an AES key for file encryption and encrypt the AES key by 
a public key that is generated on the server. Once a variant 
infects the computer, it will scan the computer’s drives to find 
files that it can encrypt. CryptoWall variants also scan the 
locate drive letters on the PC, including network shares, Drop-
box mappings, and removable drivers. Furthermore, this nasty 
type installs malware files either in the %AppData% or 
%Temp% folders and creates DECRYPT_ 
INSTRUCTION.txt,DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.html and 
DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.url files in directories where the 
CryptoWall has encrypted data [65], [66].  
8) TeslaCrypt: It is a family of crypto-ransomware that was 
first detected in February 2015. It primarily targets computer 
games such as the Call of Duty series, World of Warcraft, 
Minecraft and World of Tanks, and has been widely 
propagated in mass media as the “curse” of gamers. Tes-
laCrypt is circulated through exploit kits like Sweet Orange, 
Angler, and Nuclear, seeking out and encrypting gaming-
related files on infected computers using the AES-256-CBC 
algorithm. Furthermore, authors of this attack keep its strains’ 
encryption schemes updated regularly to steer clear of security 
researchers. A new update of TeslaCrypt (version 0.4.0) has 
included new obfuscation and evasion techniques, as well as a 
new list of file extensions [67], [68].  
As of version 0.3.5, TeslaCrypt has the ability to infect not 
only regular drives that are connected to the computer, but 
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also all the network file resources (shares). This functionality is 
only available in a few other encryptors like CryptoWall. In 
addition, after successfully encrypting files, it appends them 
with different extension names such as .encrypted .ecc,  
.vvv, .ezz, and .exx [69]. TeslaCrypt is commodity 
malware, which can be purchased on the underground 
black market. Cybercriminals pay authors of TeslaCrypt 
to use its platform and access to various delivery 
methods such as spam Botnets and exploit kits [70].  
9) Chimera: Chimera was started as a normal ransomware 
infection that encrypted local and network files (shares). 
However, some variant of Chimera (Trojan.Ransomcrypt.V) 
makes an additional threatening message. After successfully 
encrypting victims’ files, Chimera claims that if the payment is 
not received, some of the encrypted files (pictures and videos) 
will be posted on the Internet and other files will remain 
encrypted. This troublesome type combines its ransomware 
infection with extortion to make victims pay even when they 
have backups of their files. Furthermore, it circulates its 
malicious payloads via Dropbox links in phishing campaigns by 
sending phishing attacks as job offers, business proposals, 
and infected email attachments to some employees. Once 
those links are clicked, Chimera automatically downloads the 
malware, which will immediately start encrypting targeted files 
[71], [72].  
Despite Chimera’s filthy intimidation techniques, it did not 
perform as expected by its authors. None of the victims’ 
files were ever published on the Internet. However, some 
other cybercriminal gang managed to steal a significant 
part of Chimera’s source code and build other ransomware 
classes (Mischa and Petya). Moreover, those thieves 
decided to ruin the Chimera project by publicly releasing 
about 3500 of its decryption keys [73].  
10) CryptorBit: CryptorBit was released in December 2013 
and targeted all versions of Windows operating systems. Once 
it infect a computer, it encrypts any file it scans as opposed to 
targeting just specific files (as is the case with most types). 
Therefore, this type can be considered under the 
indiscriminate encryption class. However, it does not delete 
users’ files. Furthermore, CryptorBit creates a HowDecrypt.txt 
file and a HowDecrypt.gif in every folder that contains an 
encrypted file. Those files contain instructions on how to pay 
the ransom in order to decrypt the files, which can vary from 
one victim to another. It also installs some software on victims’ 
computers that mines digital crypto-currency (cryptocoin 
miner). Hence, it allows attackers to utilize the victims’ 
computers’ CPU to mine digital coins [74], [75].  
In fact, CryptorBit does not encrypt the entire file. It actually 
corrupts the data header by replacing the first 512 bytes (or 
1024 bytes) of the file, which renders the file unusable since 
programs cannot interpret the corrupted header. In addition, 
the encrypted bytes will be stored at the end of the original file. 
Then, it replaces the header with a new 512 bytes. As a result, 
CryptorBit will effectively corrupt the file because a program 
that would normally open the infected file would not recognize 
the header and would not open it. However, 
 
Table IV: Top 10 Crypto-ransomware families 
 
Family name Percentage of infected users 
CTB-Locker 25% 
  
Locky 7 % 
  
TeslaCrypt 6.5 % 
  
Scatter 2.85% 
  
Cryakl 2.8 % 
  
CryptoWall 2.3 % 
  
Shade 1.7 % 
  
Crysis 1.1 % 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Topmost cryptographic and locking 
ransomware families 
 
 
this feature makes the data recovery process possible 
by only repairing the headers and decrypting individual 
files. This process can be very cumbersome, but it is a 
valid option in many cases [76]. Table IV shows the 
percentage of infected users by the top ransomware 
families as of December 2016 [77]. 
 
B. Locking Ransomware 
 
Variants of this type deny access to the infected machines 
without encrypting or deleting files. They can lock out par-
ticular resources, such as the mouse or keyboard, in order to 
ensure limited functionality. Thus, once the ransomware is 
removed, full access is usually restored. Figure 5 summarizes 
topmost cryptographic and locking ransomware families.  
The following list summarizes the topmost locking ran-
somware families in the recent years. As attempted in the 
previous part (cryptographic ransomware), this part aims to 
identify each form of locking ransomware and how it works:  
1) FLocker: FLocker is a combination of the words “Fran-
tic” and “Locker,” which was appeared in May 2015 and was 
detected as ANDROIDOS_FLOCKER.A by Trend Micro 
security experts [78]. These experts have found over 7,000 
variants of FLocker, as its author kept updating and creating 
many variants to improve its routines and avoid detection sys-
tems. The common variants of FLocker target mobile devices 
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and smart TVs. For instance, Android.Lockdroid.E is 
capable of locking Android smart TVs [79]. However, 
this type does not infect users from particular countries. 
Therefore, before preforming any malicious behavior, it 
will check the device’s location. If the device is located in 
certain countries, it will deactivate itself immediately.  
After FLocker infects a device, it starts to run its routine 
after 30 minutes. Then FLocker starts the background 
service, which requests device admin privileges. If the user 
denies its request, it will immediately freeze the screen and 
display a fake system update. Moreover, FLocker runs in 
the background and communicates with a C&C server, 
which will deliver a new payload misspelled.apk with an 
HTML file and a JavaScript interface. The HTML page is 
able to initiate the APK and take photos of the user by 
using the JavaScript interface. These photos will be 
displayed on the ransom page. In addition, device 
information such as phone number, location, and contacts 
will be collected by the C&C server and encrypted with a 
hard-coded AES key and encoded in base64 [80]. 
 
2) Koler: This is an Android-based threat that appeared in 
April 2014. It is promoted as a hidden part of a ransomware 
campaign and masquerades as fake adult-themed apps. Koler 
infects Android users from certain countries when they visit 
suspicious adult-themed websites by asking them to download 
a fake adult app that would meet their desired contents 
(animalporn.apk). Unlike PC-based threats, the Koler 
download is neither silent nor automatic. In other words, the 
user must confirm the app installation and manually install it. 
Further, once the app is granted and installed, it will activate 
Koler and display a law enforcement agency message 
accusing the user of viewing pornographic contents and 
demanding a penalty payment [81], [82].  
About 48 pornographic websites were infected by Koler. 
When the user visits one of them, Koler’s special controller 
checks for parameters that must be met such as user’s country 
(location), type of device, and type of browser. If compatible, 
the promoted letter will be triggered. Moreover, during the in-
stallation process, some devices’ information will be collected 
and sent to a C&C server, like the IMEI number. After that, it 
will lock the device and open a browser page to display a 
persistent report over the Home screen stating that the device 
is locked and all its files are encrypted due to some security 
violations, but this report is fake. It does not encrypt files at all, 
it does interfere with normal usage of the device to enforce 
victims to pay their ransoms [83], [84].  
Cybercriminals behind Koler refined its scheme such that 
it has the ability to offer customized attacks and infect 
either mobile or PC users. When a user visits one of these 
websites, Koler redirects him to the right infrastructure 
(central hub) to download the attack. However, the mobile 
components of this threat have been shut down since July 
2014. The C&C server sent uninstall commands to infected 
devices and deleted the malicious app, whereas the rest of 
the malicious components for PC users are still active [85]. 
 
3) CTB-Locker: The word “CTB-Locker” stands for Curve-
Tor-Bitcoin Locker (also known as Critoni.A). The word “Curve” 
comes from its encryption based, which uses the elliptic curves 
algorithm. “Tor” is the malicious server that is used to protect 
the attack anonymity, as most malware variants do. “Bitcoin” 
refers to the payment method used by most ransomware [86]. 
CTB-Locker attack was discovered in July 2014 as one of the 
most dangerous ransomware routines, which was designed to 
lock victims’ computers and deny access to their files. It can be 
categorized under both crypto and locking classes. Like most 
types, CTB-Locker comes as a part of a ransomware system 
in order to bypass the detection techniques. That means it 
infects a computer with the help of another malicious payload 
that finds a flaw on the user’s computer and utilizes it as an 
entry point for CTB-Locker attack. In fact, once it infects a PC, 
it instantly disables any Antivirus software found on that PC 
[87].  
CTB-Locker is mainly delivered through aggressive spam 
campaigns and email attachments as a zip file such as a 
UPS exception notification or FedEx delivery failure 
notification [88]. When the potential victim opens the email, 
CTB-Locker will ask to download and access the zip file. 
Once accessed, the attack will be triggered and most files 
on the system will be encrypted. In fact, this malware is 
deployed as a binary code that can be executed by just 
opening the email attach-ments. Furthermore, CTB-Locker 
will immediately communi-cate with a C&C server and 
automatically start downloading its components [89].  
Like other attacks, authors of CTB-Locker have kept it re-
fined. For instance, in January 2015, they released an updated 
version of CTB-Locker targeting certain countries including 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the USA. Its infection 
was distributed as a fake fax notification via email 
attachments. Moreover, to convince victims that the CTB-
Locker attack is not invented, this version has introduced a 
new option called Test Decryption, which allows victims to 
select and decrypt five different files for free. Another update 
was released in 2016 to attack websites by encrypting all 
scripts, documents, databases, and any other important files 
[90]. Identically, it provides victims with two decryption keys to 
unlock two random files. In addition, cybercriminals claim that 
the victims will permanently lose their files if any attempts are 
made to rid the infected computer of the ransomware [4].  
4) Svpeng: Svpeng was first identified in July 2013 by 
Kaspersky Lab as a Trojan-banker that targets Android 
devices via MoneyPak [91]. Because it was originally created 
to steal users’ credential information and be aware of the 
banking apps on the infected devices, it has been modified to 
perform some ransomware functionality. Hence, it attempts to 
lock the device and display an accusing message with a fine, 
reporting that the user has accessed illegal pornographic 
contents. Within one month of its release, this nasty form was 
able to infect over 900,000 devices [92].  
As other traditional Trojan-bankers for PCs, Svpeng infects 
mobile devices using some social engineering techniques such 
as drive-by download, malicious email attachments, fake video 
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Figure 6: Windows countermeasures based on their 
traced resources 
 
 
players, and Adobe Flash player updates [93]. Furthermore, 
security researchers identified a distribution campaign that de-
livers Trojan-banker attacks to Android devices using Google 
AdSense advertisements. That campaign was launched by 
authors of Svpeng to infect users when they visit mainstream 
websites without requiring users to click on the malicious 
advertisements. In general, cybercriminals keep refining such 
a threat because mobile attack exploits are often specific to a 
version of mobile operating system [94]. 
 
C. Other Types 
 
There exist some ransomware types that perform neither 
encryption nor locking activities. Instead, they infect a ma-
chine and collect all victims’ data. Some other variants are 
capable of even accessing the webcam and taking pictures. 
Then, they create a ransom note and threaten the victims 
that if the ransoms are not paid, those variants will leak the 
victims’ private data. Another notable example of such a 
type is that some variants (can be listed as scareware) 
accuse the victims of having engaged in suspicious activity 
such as viewing pornographic contents or acquiring 
security violations. Thereby, they threaten victims to pay 
their ransoms within 24 hours. Otherwise, the scareware 
alleges that a case against the uses will be sent to trial [95]. 
 
VIII. SECURITY TECHNIQUES AND COUNTERMEASURES 
 
The knowledge about malware’s functionality is important 
for removal. In fact, to be able to completely remove a 
malware from an infected machine, it is necessary to 
remove the residues that are left behind by the malicious 
code and undo modifications that are made to legitimate 
files. Those residues can be unwanted registry entries, 
services, or pro-cesses, which require a fully understanding 
of the malicious code and its operations. However, recent 
malware tries to evade existing detection techniques by 
refraining from per-forming any malicious activity once it 
identifies the analysis environment presence [96]. 
Therefore, designing a powerful analysis system against 
malware activities is non-trivial in real-world deployment [7]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Android countermeasures based on their 
traced resources  
 
 
There are three types of analysis techniques. These 
tech-niques are static, dynamic, and hybrid. Static analysis 
ap-proaches focus on classifying operations based on 
features that can be collected without running the apps. 
However, dynamic analysis approaches collect apps’ 
features during run-time. Each technique has its pros and 
cons. For instance, static analysis can’t predict many 
sophisticated malware. Thereby, both techniques can be 
integrated to build hybrid detection systems.  
After careful selection of all possible methods that are used 
to detect and prevent ransomware attacks, this section defines 
these methods and highlights their limitations. It also distills the 
state-of-the-art in security research and identifies potential 
research directions for safeguarding billions of users. Note, the 
scope of this paper has only considered tools that are 
designed specifically to prevent ransomware attacks. Figure 6 
and Figure 7 show the relationships between the security tools 
covered in this section based on their traced resources in both 
Windows and Android platforms, respectively. 
 
A. UNVEIL 
 
This dynamic analysis approach is not at end-user machine. 
It is designed to detect ransomware based on its interaction 
with the computer’s resources. To successfully amount ran-
somware attacks and model their behaviors, it creates fake but 
meaningful resources to allow ransomware variants to tamper 
with the users’ files. In particular, UNVEIL creates an artificial 
and realistic user environment to execute and monitor 
ransomware-like process interactions with the file system. 
Furthermore, it can be used as a complement service on top of 
other dynamic analysis systems. Also, this approach can be 
used as a cloud-based malware analysis system and sample 
sharing. In addition, this system was tested on top of Cuckoo 
Sandbox, which provides the basic sandboxing services and 
supports all versions of Windows [7], [97].  
In order to address crypto-ransomware variants, authors of 
UNVEIL created a fake but attractive user environment for the 
malware to run, which contains real files with valid headers and 
meaningful names. Then they implemented a kernel-based 
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method to monitor the interactions with the file system. The 
purposes behind creating this environment are 1) to make the 
analysis more realistic; and 2) to protect the analysis system 
from some user environment fingerprinting techniques. After 
running the malware, this technique collects some process’s 
information such as the time, the process name, the process 
ID, the request in form of IRP, the argument of a request, and 
the entropy of data buffer (read or write) [7].  
On the other hand, to detect locking-ransomware variants, 
UNVEIL takes a snapshot of the clear state of the system, then 
runs the malware. In fact, a ransom note will be dis-played on 
the screen of the machine once it is infected. Therefore, this 
detection approach captures another snapshot of the system 
and measures the dissimilarity score, which is the structural 
differences between these snapshots. The value of the 
dissimilarity score is between 0 and 1 computed using 
Structural Similarity Image Metric (SSIM). The value closes to 
1 means that there are huge structural changes on the 
snapshot’s content, and vise versa [7]. 
The evaluation of UNVEIL was done through two phases. 
First, it was tested by using about 3500 known samples. Some 
of those samples are benign apps, but they can perform some 
ransomware-like behaviors such as DiskCryptor, Winzip, and 
SDelete. In the second phase, UNVEIL was evaluated by col-
lecting about 148,223 distinct samples, and using 56 UNVEIL-
enabled VMs deployed on 8 servers on a Ganeti cluster. In 
addition, this approach has discovered a new malware family 
called SilentCrypt [7].  
However, the desktop locking variants that use heuristics to 
look for specific user actions before performing their behaviors 
(e.g. waiting for multiple reboots or clicks) can evade UNVEIL 
detection technique. Furthermore, this scheme is not an end-
user solution and there was no real end-user interaction 
involved in its test phase. Another limitation is that attacks can 
possibly evade the text extraction module by using uncommon 
ransom words in their notes [7], [97]. 
 
B. CryptoDrop 
 
CryptoDrop is an early-warning detection system that is built 
to alert users when suspicious applications perform mali-cious 
activities. This Windows-based approach is a shift from similar 
initiatives such as the Linux-based Cryptostalker. Cryp-toDrop 
can work alongside malware detection tools, detecting 
ransomware-like activities that existing intrusion prevention 
tools aren’t capable of. Moreover, it combines a set of behavior 
indicators to identify processes that appear to tamper with a 
large amount of data. Once it recognizes such a ransomware-
like attempt behavior, it halts the process and stops it from 
completing its effort [12], [97]. 
Authors of CryptoDrop have described three 
scenarios of crypto-ransomware behaviors based on the 
variant activities against files. These scenarios are: 
 
1) Overwrite files: malware in this scenario will 
overwrite files’ contents and encrypt them in place. 
 
2) Change files’ locations: it changes files’ locations 
and probably rename them before encrypting and 
dropping them back in their original places.  
3) Create new files: this is the most damaging type, 
which creates new versions of files with encrypted 
contents and deletes the original ones.  
Therefore, CryptoDrop has implemented three primary indi-
cators to inspect malicious executions. One indicator identifies 
file changes based on modifications to the file byte values. An-
other indicator measures the similarity between versions of the 
same file using sdhash function. Last indicator measures the 
encrypted file’s entropy using Shannon Entropy. In addition, 
CryptoDrop uses two secondary indicators; deletion cases, 
which is triggered when files are detected after suspicious 
activity; and file type funneling, which occurs if an app reads a 
disparate number of files as it writes [12].  
Overall, this system monitors changes on the files’ con-tents 
that indicate transformation rather than inspecting 
ransomware-like attempts and identifying its execution and 
characteristics. However, CryptoDrop is not intended to stop 
ransomware attacks from the outset, or attempted to prevent 
all files from loss. Also, it is unable to investigate the intent of 
changes. In other words, CryptoDrop cannot determine 
whether the encryption is done by the user or a ransomware 
variant. Hence, it may trigger false alerts [12], [97]. 
 
C. PAYBREAK 
 
This is an automated and proactive defense system designed to 
combat against crypto-ransomware threats and keep the user files 
safe, specifically against WannaCry attacks. PayBreak intercepts 
and stores all the cryptographic materials that can be used during 
the attack in a key vault. That means, it controls the file encryption 
process by monitoring the session keys that are used on the 
victim’s machine. Furthermore, this Windows-based approach 
observes and can hold the use of these keys so that it can decrypt 
files that would otherwise only be restored by paying the ransom 
[34], [97].  
In fact, modern ransomware uses hybrid cryptosystem, 
which is a combination of symmetric and asymmetric keys to 
encrypt files. A symmetric key is used to encrypt each targeted 
file. Then a public key will be generated to encrypt these 
symmetric keys while the decryption private key is held by the 
ransomware attacker. When an attack infects a computer, 
PayBreak records and stores the symmetric keys before they 
get encrypted by the public key. With that, the victim can 
retrieve the ransom keys and decrypt infected files [34].  
In addition, the effectiveness of PayBreak was evaluated by 
running 107 ransomware samples of 20 distinct families in a 
controlled environment. Those samples are collected by using 
a system designed by authors of PayBreak called Real-time 
Automation to Discover, Delete, and Alert of Ransomware 
(RADDAR). However, this approach was only able to recover 
files encrypted by 12 family variants. Moreover, it failed to 
determine samples that use environment fingerprinting tech-
niques, as well as variants that use heuristics to look for 
specific user actions before performing their behaviors. Also, 
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it performs its protection task with a performance 
overhead due to its dynamic hooking techniques and the 
key escrow mechanism [34]. 
 
D. Redemption 
 
Redemption is a real-time data-loss-fee protection frame-
work designed to make the OS more resilient to ransomware 
threats. This end-user approach monitors apps’ I/O request 
patterns on a per-process basis to indicate the ransomware-
like behaviors. When an I/O request pattern is identified for a 
possible ransomware activity, the offending process will be 
terminated. Therefore, the data can be restored. However, 
Redemption requires some modifications of the OS to maintain 
a transparent buffer for I/O storage [97].  
Furthermore, the performance of this approach is based on 
two main components. The first component contains a 
constructed behavior abstraction of a large class of character-
izations of current ransomware attacks. To determine whether 
the process exhibits a malicious behavior or not, Redemption 
applies the results of a long-term dynamic analysis to the 
binary objects. If the process matches the abstract model, it 
will be labeled as malicious. The second component contains 
a transparent buffer utilization mechanism used to redirect 
requests while tracking the write contents in order to restore all 
infected files [97].  
The evaluation of this system was run on 677 ransomware 
samples from 29 families. Redemption was capable of en-
hancing protection against the collected attacks, achieving a 
very high detection rate in such a successful application-
transparent manner. However, it fails to distinguish between 
benign apps that exhibit some ransomware-like behaviors. 
Also, if it happens that the malice score of a process is lower 
than the detection threshold, it would not be discriminated. In 
addition, this framework is unable to detect social engineering 
techniques, which can be used by cybercriminals to shut it 
down unless they are detected by other security solutions 
running on the same computer [97]. 
 
E. CLDSafe 
 
This file backup system is a cloud based designed against 
ransomware to back up user’s files automatically and keep 
shadow copies safe in order to provide secure restoration when a 
machine is infected. CLDSafe saves copies of user’s files in a 
cloud storage system after it measures the similarity score 
between the new file on user’s machine and the old version stored 
in the cloud storage using a separate place called secret area. The 
reason of using this cloud storage system is that commercial cloud 
storages provide limited spaces, where users cannot keep all 
backups in one storage. Also, some ransomware forms are 
capable of infecting backup shadows if they are synchronized with 
the infected machines such as CryptoLocker attacks. Thus, the 
secret area in CLDSafe is needed to overcome autonomous 
synchronization [98].  
Furthermore, to investigate ransomware infections, the sim-
ilarity score is computed using a context triggered piecewise 
 
hash technique called ssdeep [99]. Once an infection is dis-
covered, CLDSafe allows authenticated users to restore backup 
files using challenge-response mechanism in the secret area. This 
approach backs up files only when there are changes made to 
them. Moreover, when the similarity score is low, which indicates 
changes on the new files, CLDSafe copies the old files to the 
secret area in order to restore them in a secure manner. In 
addition, CLDSafe is capable of detecting and blocking storage-
consuming attacks such as denial of service attack. The Storage 
consumption occurs when the resources are fully occupied. 
However, CLDSafe cloud storage system only backs up a file 
when there is a notable changes, which does not cause much 
memory or CPU consumption [98].  
CLDSafe id evaluated using 210 file modification cases 
as follows. The fist 200 cases were ordinary cases from 
four types of data file. These types are .pptx, .xlsx, .docx, 
and .hwp. Each type has five samples and each sample is 
measured ten times. The remaining ten cases were 
ransomware files infected by CryptoLocker. The similarity 
threshold of this approach is set to 80 to lower the storage 
overhead to 51% and keep the overall performance 
efficient if compared to commercial cloud storages [98]. 
However, CLDSafe would failed against some ransomware 
variants that only encrypt a part of the data file. A notable 
example of those variants is CryptorBit, which corrupts the 
data header by replacing the first 512 bytes or 1024 bytes. 
When the encrypted part is less or equal to 20% of the total 
data size, the similarity score will be above the threshold. 
Therefore, CLDSafe considers it as an ordinary case. 
 
F. CloudRPS 
 
This ransomware prevention approach uses a cloud 
analysis technique to collect and analyze device information 
aiming to detect abnormal behaviors and minimize the 
possibility of early infections. In particular, CloudRPS collects 
data from an integrated cloud system and analyzes these data 
to investigate ransomware intrusions [100]. This approach 
consists of six components as follows:  
1) Server Monitor: This component consists of 
condition manager to check the server’s status, 
activity status, and whitelisting; and reporter to 
send the results to the next component.  
2) File Monitor: It is used to monitor files. It consists of 
threat prevention, which helps to update security 
patches of the device’s programs; folder management to 
automatically hide shared folders and allow authorized 
access only; initial classifier to monitor file’s operation; 
network control to control network communications; and 
reporter to share analysis results.  
3) Network Monitor: It monitors and analyzes the traffic 
and reports of user’s device. The collected elements 
in this component include network information, 
network signature, traffic frequency, and whitelisting.  
4) Ransomware Inspector: It is used to monitor the user 
device changes and manage the device state and in-
formation. This component contains some prevention 
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factors such as OS update, network, data backup, 
server, and file check. Moreover, these factors are 
synchronized in real time through the Cloud system.  
5) Analyzer: This component performs a hybrid 
analysis. It also contains a reporter that reports 
results to the classifier.  
6) Classifier: Its task is to categorize the transmitted data 
that is received from the network monitor, the files 
monitor, the server monitor, and the analyzer based on 
the threat level and store the result in a database. 
 
CloudRPS detects many servers’, networks’, and files’ 
ran-somware attacks by monitoring filesystem operations 
[100]. However, as most cloud-based detection systems, 
this ap-proach is limited in terms of storage spaces. Also, 
synchroniz-ing files can cause time consumption. 
Therefore, the infection might not be prevented. 
 
G. ShieldFS 
 
ShieldFS is a Windows-based add-on driver designed to 
make the filesystem immune to ransomware attacks. This 
approach contains a protection layer that can be dynamically 
toggled for each running process and performed as a copy-on-
write mechanism. Furthermore, it contains a set of adaptive 
models that copy the system activity over time. These models 
are updated by a monitoring component that investigates low-
level and I/O filesystem requests. Once a process violates 
these profiled models, its operation will be determined as a 
malicious behavior [101].  
ShieldFS was designed after analyzing a large amount of 
low-level and I/O filesystem requests collected from a set of 
benign apps. Its detection technique was built based on the 
following parameters: the combined analysis of entropy in write 
operations; frequency of read, write, and folder-listing 
operations; dispersion of per-file writes; fraction of files 
renamed; and the file-type usage statistics. Moreover, it makes 
a decision within each tick, which is the clock of ShieldFS. 
Ticks are triggered based on the percentage of files accessed. 
All these parameters are considered to create an automated 
detection models that can indicate ransomware processes at 
run-time, as well as the use of cryptographic primitives by 
scanning the memory of any malicious process and searching 
for traces of the typical block cipher key schedules [101].  
The detection technique of ShieldFS was applied in a real-time, 
self-healing virtual filesystem that shadows the write operations. 
That means that when a malicious process alters a file, the 
filesystem will present the original, mirrored copy to the user space 
apps as a shadowing mechanism that can be activated and 
deactivated dynamically depending on the detec-tion logic. These 
copies will be deleted when the process has been cleared as 
benign. In addition, ShieldFS was evaluated by running 688 
ransomware samples collected from 11 distinct families in real-
world working conditions. It was able to achieve a very high 
accuracy score by detecting the malicious activity at runtime and 
transparently recovering all the original files. However, authors of 
ShieldFS have mentioned a few 
 
limitations [101]. The most critical issues are highlighted 
as follows: 
 
1) Susceptibility to Targeted Evasion: If the thresholds of the 
classifiers and the value of the parameter T (which 
determines how often ShieldFS should create shadowed 
copies of the files) are known by the malware, it could 
attempt to perform mimicry attacks by encrypting a few files 
and remain below the thresholds for T hours. In this case 
ShieldFS would not indicate as a malicious process. 
 
2) Multiprocess Malware: Ransomware can fork its ma-
licious code by injecting many benign apps, each of 
which performs a small part. Such an attack can 
evade the detection technique of this system.  
3) Tampering with the Kernel: ShieldFS runs in a priv-
ileged kernel mode. However, administrator 
privileged processes can shut down ShieldFS 
services when the machine is booted. 
 
H. EldeRan 
 
This is a machine learning system designed to dynamically 
analyze ransomware and classify them based on their early 
attempts. It monitors behaviors that can be performed by apps 
in their installation phase by inspecting for ransomware-like 
behaviors and characteristic signs before they infect victims. 
Furthermore, EldeRan identifies relevant dynamic features that 
can be used to detect ransomware. Then, it employs a 
machine learning classifier to classify each installed app such 
that it can provide detection without relying on classical 
heuristics or signature-based techniques [8].  
Additionally, EldeRan identifies the most significant ran-
somware dynamic features and creates signatures for new 
variants. More precisely, it performs its dynamic analysis in a 
sandboxed environment that contains two datasets: a ransomware 
dataset of 582 samples from 11 distinct families and a benign 
dataset of 942 goodware samples. Within each sample, EldeRan 
retrieves and analyzes the following features: 
 
Windows API calls and native functions tracing  
Registry key operations (open, read, write, and delete) 
File system operations (open, read, write, and delete)  
Directory operations (the enumeration and creation 
oper-ations performed on directories)  
Dropped files (set of files dropped by an application 
during installation) 
Strings (embedded in the binary) 
 
Except the Strings, these features are collected while dy-
namically analyzing apps. The machine learning technique in 
EldeRan consists of two stages: 1) feature selection, and 2) 
classification. In the first stage, it applies a feature selection 
algorithm (Mutual Information criterion) to select the most 
relevant dynamic features, whereas in the second stage, a 
Regularized Logistic Regression classifier is applied to the 
matrices that contain these features to distinguish between 
ransomware and goodware applications [8].  
The experimental results of this approach have proven 
its efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, the accuracy of 
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the Regularized Logistic Regression has been evaluated by 
comparing it with other machine learning classifiers such as 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Naive Bayes. It outper-
forms Naive Bayes and is competitive with respect to the 
SVM. Also, it shows how dynamic analysis can be used to 
utilize the set of characteristic features that are common 
across ransomware families at run-time. However, EldeRan 
fails to extract features of some samples where they are 
silent for sometime or variants that use heuristics to look for 
specific user actions before they perform their malicious 
activities [5], [8]. 
 
I. HelDroid 
 
This automated system combines static taint analysis with 
lightweight symbolic execution to find possible paths that indi-
cate ransomware-like behaviors. It considers “building blocks” 
that are typically needed to build a ransomware app. HelDroid 
has the ability to identify apps that attempt to lock or encrypt 
the device without the user’s awareness, as well as ransom 
notes that are displayed on the screen. Additionally, this 
approach uses a learning-based, “natural language processing 
(OpenNLP)” technique that recognizes menacing phrases to 
detect threatening aspects of ransomware [43].  
HelDroid analyzes each Android app APK file to determine 
whether it is a ransomware or benign app. In its detection pro-
cess, it employs three independent detectors that are executed 
simultaneously. Each detector investigates a specific indicator 
of typical ransomware-like behavior. The first detector is called 
“Threatening Text Detector,” which uses text classification to 
detect coercion attempts and threatening messages. The 
result of this classifier depends on the other detectors. If it is 
positive, but the others are not, the sample will be labeled as 
scareware. The second and third detectors are the “Encryption 
Detector” and the “Locking Detector.” If the app performs 
either action, one of these detectors will be triggered. 
Therefore, the application will be labeled as a ransomware 
sample [43].  
Furthermore, the deterministic decision criteria of HelDroid 
is based on static analysis. Although most of its analysis 
process is static, the Threatening Text Detector executes the 
code in case there is no ransom note found in the files, which 
supports off-band text (such as messages loaded from a 
remote server). In addition, it considers the presence of the 
ransom note as mandatory for a ransomware attack to reach 
their intention. Thus, if the Threatening Text Detector is not 
triggered, the app will be considered a benign sample [43].  
Overall, HelDroid is implemented and tested on active Android 
ransomware samples. Its detection features are para-metric and 
can be adaptable to future families. Hence, it works without 
requiring certain samples of any ransomware family beforehand 
except a small portion of sentences obtained from ransomware 
sample threatening notes. It successfully exhibited nearly zero 
false positives and detected all the ransomware samples. 
Although it fails to detect ransomware samples that use evasion 
mechanisms or embedding cryptographic primi-tives, it is capable 
of recognizing unknown samples. However, 
 
ransomware notes that are written in foreign languages are 
not supported by the Threatening Text Detector. As a 
result, re-training the NLP classifier with foreign language 
ransom texts is required. Moreover, HelDroid should be 
integrated into the device OS in a trusted domain. This 
crucial integration allows the system to block malicious 
code actions. To solve such a problem, both encryption and 
locking indicators must have high priority [43]. 
 
J. Sdguard 
 
This proposed solution implements fine-grain permission 
control based on Linux Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
mechanism to detect crypto-ransomware attempts. Sdguard 
consists of two main components. The first component is the 
activity stack monitor, which monitors Android activity stack. 
The second component is the I/O log analyzer and the access 
control list, which allows users to grant certain permissions to 
the installed applications. When an app creates a file, Sdguard 
uses FUSE file system (Filesystem in Userspace) to modify 
the owner and group of the file according to the UID and GID 
of the app. Moreover, the FUSE daemon contains a 
permission checker module to verify permissions and file’s UID 
before determine an access [102].  
Another service that FUSE daemon provides is an I/O 
recorder, which records all I/O operations to external storage, 
then write log to a file. This log file is parsed to investigate 
malicious behavior existence by the I/O log analyzer. On the 
other hand, the activity stack monitor observes an activity that 
is located on top of the stack. Once it finds an activity on top of 
the stack for long time and this activity does not belong to the 
Android lock-screen service, it will be determined as a 
ransomware activity attempting to lock the user screen. 
Therefore, this activity is killed to eliminate the threat [102]. 
 
K. R-PackDroid 
 
R-PackDroid [103] is a machine learning approach de-
signed to detect Android ransomware based on extracted API 
package information. This static detection system is used to 
label inspected applications as one of three classes; either 
ransomware, malware, or trusted app. To identify the app’s 
classes, this system uses three phases as follows:  
1) Preprocessing: In this stage, the inspected app’s 
Dalvik bytecode is statically analyzed to determine 
the packages of all APIs.  
2) Feature Extraction: Features are selected based on 
the occurrences of each API package, which identify 
the vector numbers that are used in the next stage.  
3) Classification: Extracted data from the aforementioned 
phase is forwarded to a trained mathematical function 
that statically classifies and label the inspected app. In 
particular, random forest classifications are employed.  
R-PackDroid was evaluated and tested by using data that 
are different than the data used to train the system. These 
datasets were collected from different resources such as Hel-
Droid [43], Drebin [104], and VirusTotal [105]. Moreover, an 
open source crawler was used to download trusted apps from 
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Google Play market. In addition, R-PackDroid exhibits a high 
detection rate with a very good performances. However, as it 
entirely performs as a static analysis system, R-PackDroid is 
subject to some limitations such as suspicious payloads that 
are dynamically loaded at run time or fully encrypted classes. 
Also, this system was not tested against obfuscated 
applications. Therefore, it uses VirusTotal service to confirm its 
classification results and reduce its false positive rate [103]. 
 
L. DNA-Droid 
 
DNA-Droid is a hybrid analysis system used to detect 
ransomware applications in Android platform. This framework 
utilizes features and deep neural network to discriminate 
between suspicious and goodware samples. DNA-Droid aims 
to detect ransomware actions in early stage by extracting 
app’s static features and label it. If the app is labeled as 
suspicious, DNA-Droid applies dynamic analysis to monitor 
run-time behaviors. The inspected app will be terminated once 
its operations match with collection of malicious behaviors 
(DNAs), which are produced during the training phase. In 
addition, DNA-Droid uses Binary and Multiple Sequence 
Alignment techniques to profile ransomware families [106].  
In the static stage, DNA-Droid includes three modules 
to evaluate miscellaneous aspects of Android APK files 
as follows:  
1) Text Classification Module (TCM): To detect ran-som 
notes, DNA-Droid uses Natural Language Toolkit 
(NLTK) to perform linguistic analysis. It extracts 
strings from the apk file and constructs ransom words 
in dif-ferent classes such as encryption, locking, 
threatening, pornography and money. For each class, 
TCM calculates the similarity score to indicate the 
existence of each class in the inspected apk.  
2) Image Classification Module (ICM): Similar to TCM, ICM 
extracts images form the sample apk file to match it with 
different logos classified into different categories such as 
banks, police, and low enforcements. To measure the 
similarity score, ICM uses the Structural Similarity Index 
Measure algorithm (SSIM) and reports the number of 
collected images. Moreover, to detect porn pictures, ICM 
uses a skin color model to classify them to nude or non-
nude pictures.  
3) API calls and permissions Module (APM): It extracts 
permissions and APIs used by the inspected apk file.  
Furthermore, DNA-Droid uses Deep Auto Encoder to im-
prove detection rate and classification performance. In the 
dynamic analysis stage, DNA-Droid executes the app using 
an emulator and collects some information such as system 
sequence and API calls. If the app’s API sequences match 
with any of the DNA, the app will be terminated [106]. 
 
M. Song et al. Method 
 
Many ransomware attacks in mobile platforms are not new 
to the existence. Cybercriminals keep refining threats because 
mobile attack exploits are often specific to a version of 
operating system [94]. Therefore, Song et al. proposed 
 
a method that can prevent modified ransomware attacks in 
Android system. This solution uses statical methods based 
on CPU and memory usage as well as I/O rates to monitor 
execution operations and files events and specify abnormal 
operations. Once a suspicious operation is identified, it will 
be terminated and reported to the user and stored to a 
database for future investigation. This method is 
implemented in the source code of Android. Thus, it can 
detect modified ransomware patterns [46]. Furthermore, 
this method is designed with three modules as follows:  
1) Configuration Module: It is the basic step of this detec-
tion technique. Its job is to specify the files location that 
are targeted by the attack and register them in a watch 
list table. The location of these files is called priority 
protection area (PPA). Also, this module registers user’s 
feedback on the inspected process into the database. If 
the use reports it as ransomware, it will be stored and 
automatically deleted. Otherwise, the process will keep 
running even if it is detected again.  
2) Monitoring Module: It is responsible for monitoring the 
PPA and the process. This module consists of two parts. 
The fist part monitors the status of the file event such as 
reading, writing, and delete. On the other hand, the 
second part monitors the process information such as 
memory and I/O count. In addition, this module handles 
malicious behaviors stored in the database by stopping 
and deleting them once they are detected.  
3) Processing Module: It stops the monitors process if it is 
reported as suspicious and warns the user about the risk 
behind it. Moreover, processing module removes the 
malicious apps and deletes any process belongs to it.  
However, this method reports the detection result to the 
user in order to either allow the process or deny it, which 
harms the user’s files if granted accidentally. Also, users must 
be knowledgeable about ransomware attacks and how they 
perform in order to provide the right decision to this method. 
Otherwise, their files would be infected. These limitations can 
be fixed by completely killing the process and then report it to 
the user with a recommendation to uninstall the corresponding 
app. Another solution can be done through applying a dynamic 
analysis on new/updated applications installed on the device to 
detect ransomware apps in their early stage. 
 
N. Mercaldo et al. Method 
 
Another method was developed by Mercaldo et al. 
[41] based on formal methods to identify the 
ransomware instruc-tions inside the malware code. This 
framework is structured by following three processes:  
1) Formal Model Construction: It extracts and parse 
the formal methods from the app’s Java bytecode. 
This process uses a custom parser based on the 
Apache Commons Bytecode Engineering Library 
(BCEL) to parse the bytecode of classes and JAR 
files. To pro-duce the formal methods from the 
parsed bytecode, this approach exploited the 
Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). 
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Table V: Covered tools’ summary 
 
 Platform Name of Tool Supplementary Technique Targeted Families Notable Limitations  
 
  
UNVEIL 
Cuckoo Sandbox, Structural Similarity Image Metric CryptoWall, CTB-Locker, CryptoLocker, Tox, Reveton, CrypVault, Heuristics variants, Not an end-user solution 
 
  
(SSIM), Windows Minifilter Driver framework VirLock, CoinVault, Filecoder, TeslaCrypt, Tobfy, and Urausy           
 
   File utility program, sdhash, Shannon Entropy Virlock, CTB-Locker, MBL Advisory, CryptoLocker, Trojan-FUE2, Do not prevent all files from loss, Cannot deter- 
 
  CryptoDrop  CryptoWall, CryptoDefense, Pgpcoder, CryptoFortress, CryptoTor- mine the encryption source 
 
    Locker2015, Filecoder, Xorist, and PoshCoder    
 
  
ShieldFS 
Virtual filesystem with shadowing mechanism CryptoWall, TeslaCrypt, CryptoDefense, Crowti, and Critroni Susceptibility to evasion, fails against DoS, mul- 
 
    tiprocess malware, and tampering with the ker-  
     
 
     nel attacks  
 
       
   Real-time Automation to Discover, Delete, and Alert Almalocker, Cerber, Chimera, CryptoFortress, CryptoLocker, Cryp- Can’t recover all infected files, fails against 
 
  PAYBREAK of Ransomware (RADDAR), fuzzy function, Mi- toWall, CrypWall, Tox, GPcode, Locky, SamSam, and Thor Locky fingerprinting techniques and heuristics variants 
 
   crosoft Research’s Detours library, Cuckoo Sandbox     
 
 
Windows 
 Fuzzy hashing (ssdeep context triggered piecewise This tool was tested against CryptoLocker variants only Needs a separate place to restore files in order  
    
  CLDSafe hashing), cloud storage system, challenge-response  to overcome autonomous synchronization, fails 
 
   mechanism  against variants that encrypt 20% or less of the 
 
     file   
 
  
CloudRPS 
integrated with a cloud system, unknown classifier not specified samples limited storage space, large files cause time con- 
 
    
sumption. Therefore infections are not prevented       
 
   Microsoft Reparse Points, Behavioral Detection and CryptoDefense, CryptoLocker, CryptoFortress, CTB-Locker, Tox, Fails to distinguish benign apps that exhibit 
 
  
Redemption 
Notification Module, Malice Score Calculation Func- CryptoWall,  WannaCry,  Jigsaw,  SilentCrypt,  Filecoder,  Torrent- some ransomware-like behaviors, unable to de- 
 
  tion (MSC), Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) Locker, TeslaCrypt, CryptXXX, GPcode, PoshCoder, MBL Advi- tect social engineering techniques 
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    sory, Virlock, ZeroLocker, Locky, CoinVault, CrypVault, Crowti,    
 
   CryptMIC, DirtyDecrypt, HDDCryptor, Xorist, Petya, and Critroni            
 
  
EldeRan 
Mutual Information criterion and Regularized Logis- CryptoWall,  Critroni,  CryptoLocker,  Kollah,  Matsnu,  Pgpcoder, Can’t extract features from silent samples and 
 
  tic Regression classifier Reveton, Kovter, Locker, TeslaCrypt, and Trojan-Ransom heuristics variants       
 
       
   Cybozu  open-source  library,  Google  Translator, Koler, Simplocker, Svpeng, New Simplocker, ScarePackage, other Threatening Text Detector supports only few 
 
  Heldroid Stop-word Project, Optical Character Recognition unknown types languages, must have high priority in the device 
 
   (OCR) software, natural language processing (NLP)  OS   
 
   supervised classifier     
 
  Song et al. Modifications applied to the Android source code Authors used some sample to test their approach and did not Depends  on  user’s  feedback,  users  must  be 
 
  Method  specified targeted ransomware families aware of the attack to provide the right decision 
 
  
DNA-Droid 
Deep  Auto  Encoder,  Binary  and  Multiple  Se- Crosate, Koler, Locker, FakeInst, Spy, Simplocker, Jagonca, Torec Produce a high false positive rate. Therefore; 
 
 
Android 
quence Alignment, Structural Similarity Image Met-  it uses supplementary techniques to improve  
   
 
  ric (SSIM), Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK)  detection and classification performance      
 
  
Sdguard 
Linux Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Filesys- Proposed solution has not specified targeted ransomware families Users have to be knowledgeable in order to 
 
  tem in Userspace (FUSE) file system  set up specific access rules, it dealers some  
    
 
     permissions to root the device 
 
   Scikit-Learn ML library, open source crawler, Virus- Svpeng, Simplocker, New Simplocker, Koler, ScarePackage, and Use VirusTotal to reduce false positive rate, 
 
  R-PackDroid Total some unknown samples unable to detect suspicious behaviors that are 
 
     loaded at run time or fully encrypted classes, 
 
     was not tested against obfuscated apps 
 
  Mercaldo et Apache  Commons  Bytecode  Engineering  Library Locker,  Koler,  fbilocker,  scarepackage,  FakeInstaller,  Plankton, Evaluated  against  general  malware  solutions, 
 
  al. Method (BCEL), mu-calculus, Concurrency Workbench of DroidKungFu, GinMaster, BaseBridge, Adrd, Kmin, Geinimi, Droid- evaluation did not include better solutions such 
 
   New Century (CWB-NC), Calculus of Communicat- Dream, Opfake as McAfee and Kaspersky 
 
   ing Systems (CCS)     
 
        
 No More Ransom provides many security solutions for Teslacrypt, Chimera, Marsjoke, Coinvault, Shade, Rakhni, WildFire, and Rannoh ransomware attacks  
 
         
2) Temporal Logic Properties Construction: This process 
defines the ransomware distinctive characteristics and 
behaviors. In order to do that, a few ransomware samples 
were manually inspected to specify their properties and 
write them as a set, which is used to find the ransomware 
payload in the bytecode. Moreover, mu-calculus [107] is 
used to express the behavioral properties. 
 
3) Ransomware Family Detection: In this process, a 
formal verification environment called Concurrency 
Workbench of New Century (CWB-NC) [108] is 
applied to rec-ognize the ransomware type based 
on its set of logic properties.  
Furthermore, using bytecode in malware detection system has 
many benefits such as independence of the source pro-gramming 
language, identify malware without decompilation, easiness of 
parsing low-level code, and independence from ob-fuscation [41]. 
In addition, authors of this method encouraged using it against 
ransomware threats based on their experiment results. However, 
this method was evaluated against some general malware 
solutions that are not specifically designed against ransomware 
attacks. Authors also stated that those solutions are the top ten 
signature-based antimalware. In Fact, authors did not include 
better solutions that are ranked as one of the top ten signature-
based antimalware such as McAfee, Kaspersky, TotalAV, and 
Norton. 
 
O. No More Ransom 
 
This project was established by a group of IT security ven-
dors and law enforcement organizations in July 2016 to disrupt 
ransomware cybercriminal businesses. It is led by Europol, the 
European Union’s law enforcement agency, including Intel 
Security and Kaspersky Lab [109], and has since added 13 
new law enforcement agencies all around Europe. This effort 
provides many security solutions like prevention advice, 
investigation assistance, wealth of information on ransomware, 
and decryption tools. For instance, they provide decryption 
tools for Teslacrypt, Chimera, Marsjoke, Coinvault, Shade, 
Rakhni, WildFire, and Rannoh ransomware attacks. According 
to a security report generated by McAfee Labs in December 
2016, No More Ransom has allowed victims to avoid paying 
more than US$1.48 million to cybercriminals. Furthermore, its 
website has received more than 24.5 million visitors since it 
was launched (about 400,000 visitors every day) [20], [110].  
Due to the availability of ransomware code and creative 
derivatives, which are provided as Ransomware-as-a-service 
in dark markets, most security companies find it easier to avoid 
the threat than to fight against it. That means when a machine 
is infected by a ransomware attack, this project aims to 
educate users about how ransomware performs and what 
suitable countermeasures can be used to prevent such an 
attack. The more security vendors involved in this initiative, the 
better the results provided can be. Hence, it is open to other 
public and private parties to join. In addition, with such an 
initiative and with more parties as well as development and 
release of ransomware prevention techniques, the volume and 
effectiveness of ransomware attacks will be reduced. 
 
However, this project provides solutions only for some 
forms of ransomware. Therefore, cybercriminals can 
keep deploying threats and attacking users by using 
other variants and target-ing other countries [20], [110]. 
 
IX. USER POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Ransomware threats have recently occupied a big part of 
the threat landscape. Business organizations and individuals 
who have been infected with ransomware attacks may decide 
to merely accept the situation and pay ransoms without any 
further investigation. Hence, it is vital to educate users about 
ransomware threats and encourage them to adopt best 
solutions. Malware such as scareware can take on the ap-
pearance of ransomware attacks to distract victims while the 
real malicious activity is active to perform some data theft 
attack. This section aims to educate both organizations and 
individuals to safeguard their environments and themselves 
against ransomware attacks as follows: 
 
A. Backups 
 
Attackers are capable of pushing their malicious activities to 
millions of users. They often lock/encrypt resources using 
strong and unbreakable techniques. Therefore, one of the key 
pillars of combating attacks of ransomware is backing up 
valuable data. However, as illustrated in this study, some 
ransomware attacks are even capable of encrypting or deleting 
backups. Also, restored access to encrypted data by paying 
the ransom is not always guaranteed. Hence, backing up data 
in external storage is a must, and it should not be a 
replacement for a robust security strategy. It is highly 
recommended that users validate recovery points and update 
backups. Also, they are encouraged to have backup storage in 
a location that is only accessible by a secure mode system. 
 
B. Network Scan and Traffic Monitoring 
 
Network administrators must run a habitual test on their 
environments to fix existing bugs that cybercriminals may 
use. They should keep security software updated and rely 
on strong indicators of trust. Also, they must perform a full 
network scan to investigate malware infections. If any 
compromised computer is identified, it should be isolated 
from the network until it is fully cleaned and restored.  
Furthermore, monitoring network traffic is a network man-
agement process that is applied to study the network communi-
cations and ensure the normality of the network performance and 
security. The process of monitoring network traffic in-corporates 
network sniffing and packet capturing techniques to review each 
incoming and outgoing packet. Therefore, to mitigate ransomware 
attacks, scanning the network and monitoring its traffic play a key 
role in identifying suspicious operations such as encryption and 
locking activities. 
 
C. Phishing Emails 
 
Ransomware attacks are spread using multiple infection 
vectors. However, cybercriminals know the majority of peo-
ple who are aware of the capability of ransomware attacks. 
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Therefore, they continue to refine more advanced tactics. They 
usually use spear-phishing emails in the first stage of attacking 
victims. End-user training for organizations and individuals 
would reduce the risk of malicious emails from being opened 
and spread in the first place. Users are highly advised to 
immediately delete any suspicious emails they receive.  
In particular, emails from unrecognized senders, which may 
contain links and/or attachments that prompt users to enable 
macros, can be used for legitimate purposes. For instance, 
attackers can use malicious macros to run malware through 
Microsoft Office documents and perform automated tasks. 
Thus, Microsoft has mitigated this infection by disabling 
macros from loading in its documents by default. However, 
attackers can use other ways to convince users to run it such 
as using social engineering techniques. 
 
D. General Recommendations 
 
A successful attack on a targeted organization can poten-
tially compromise thousands of computers, ending up with a 
massive operational disruption and serious damages to their 
revenue. Therefore, they must be aware of the threats posed 
by ransomware attacks. Moreover, they must have 
multilayered security solutions to minimize the chance of 
malware infec-tions and become more competent. Most 
importantly, security administrators must be aware of the 
problem and the way it spreads. The following list contains a 
number of policies and procedures that would minimize the 
success of ransomware attacks if followed: 
 
Keep system and software patches updated and 
verify if they are applied successfully. Many security 
enhance-ments are released frequently to mitigate 
discovered vulnerabilities.  
For systems and devices that cannot be patched, risks 
can be mitigated by leveraging app whitelisting, which 
prevents the execution of unapproved programs. 
These systems and devices must be isolated from the 
network using firewalls and intrusion detection system 
(IDS). Also, it is highly recommended to disable 
unnecessary services and ports to reduce the 
possibility of exploiting entry points.  
If possible, do not store sensitive data on local 
disks. It should be stored on secure network drives. 
That will reduce the downtime of infected systems, 
which can be recovered by simply re-imaging them. 
Also, be aware of your critical data’s location and 
the methods that might be used to infiltrate it.  
Unwanted programs and traffic must be blocked. If 
Tor is not needed, block the app and its traffic on 
the network. As most ransomware attacks use Tor 
to perform their activities, blocking Tor will often 
stop the encryption process.  
Use virtual infrastructure for critical systems that are 
isolated from the rest of the network.  
If users need to connect to untrusted resources, 
they should use secure VPN middleware. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has done a systematic review of the terms 
related to ransomware attacks and summarized behavioral 
descriptions of the most common families in the Windows and 
Android platforms. Ransomware variants are the most 
prevalent attacks of today. Practically, they aim at user’s 
victimization. With the effective extortion schemes that support 
financial malware development, cybercriminals are getting 
more sophisticated in the way they craft their malware. This 
paper has briefly sum-marized the background of ransomware 
attack and distilled the state-of-the-art of recent research. Its 
scope has covered the major existing security efforts, which 
can provide users with rich information and security solutions 
to achieve their objectives. Security countermeasures are 
carefully selected from miscellaneous aspects to meet most 
research needs in this particular type of attack. Finally, this 
research can benefit the security community as well as 
researchers to further safeguard organizations and individuals. 
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